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Articles
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A Need for
Re-evaluation of the Non-exhaustion
Doctrine Applied to Prisoner
Section 1983 Lawsuits
KEVIN THOMAS DUFFYt
I. Introduction
The recent explosion of litigation in federal courts has been
noted by many judicial spokesmen and commentators,1 includ-
ing the Supreme Court Justices led by Chief Justice Burger.2 In-
deed, this litigious aspect of our society has been commented on
not only by those directly involved in our justice system, but
also by weekly magazines and other commentators on our daily
life.2 The federal district courts have been the targets of much of
this litigation boom.4 In the United States district courts be-
tween 1975 and 1982, there was a 75.8% increase in civil litiga-
tion. That is, the number of cases filed expanded from 117,320
to 206,193. 6 This resort to the federal courts can be explained in
part by a dramatic increase in lawsuits brought by state prison-
t Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York; A.B., 1954,
Fordham College; LL.B., 1958, Fordham University. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Margaret S. Groban, Esq., for her valuable contribution to this Article.
1. Feinberg, The State of the Second Circuit, 38 Rac. A.B. Crry N.Y. 363, 368
(May/June 1983); Smith, The Role of the Federal Courts, 88 CASE & CoM. 10 (1983);
Glaberson, U.S. Supreme Court Faces Heavy Calendar in New Terms, 188 N.Y.L.J. 66
(1982).
2. W. BURGER, C.J., YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARv 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as BURGER REPORT].
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 5, 1981, § 4 (Week in Review), at 8, col 1.
4. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DnMCrOR OF nm ADnmNsTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED
STATES CouRTs (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 ANNUAL REPORT]; id. (1975). District
court civil filings rose 14.2% in 1982 to reach an all time high of 206,193.
5. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 218 table C3.
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ers for federal habeas corpus relief' and for relief from alleged
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). The statute provides:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the exis-
tence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies availa-
ble in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for
the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia,
shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit -
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or
over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depriva-
tion of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in
the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a de-
termination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual deter-
mination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on
a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to
(7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the
respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/4
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deprivation of their constitutional and civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 Civil rights cases brought in federal court by
state court prisoners in 1966 amounted merely to a few hundred
filings.8 By 1982, the number of filings had increased to over
17,545. 9
A cursory review of such cases clearly shows that a paradox
exists whereby a state prisoner's access to federal court is more
restricted on a question of life and death than it is on an issue of
trivial inconvenience or annoyance. A state prisoner attempting
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by
the State court was erroneous.
(e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such
State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual is-
sue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record per-
tinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such deter-
mination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to
produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the
record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an
appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the
record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances
what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination.
(f) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk
of such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion or other
reliable written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court
shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
Id.
7. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Congress granted the district courts original jurisdiction to hear
civil rights disputes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
8. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER
Civn. RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL
CENTER REPORT).
9. The 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, does not distinguish between filings by
state or federal prisoners. However, for purposes of this Article, the assumption is that
the cases brought against the United States involve a federal prisoner and the cases
brought privately involve a state prisoner. Of the 17,545 filed - 834 were brought
against the United States and 16,739 were private cases.
19831
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to correct constitutional wrongs in his conviction or sentence is
required by the mandates of statute to exhaust state remedies.
The same state prisoner, by alleging an inconsequential civil
rights infraction, is entitled to direct access to federal court ne-
cessitating the state to expend time and money to answer the
charge.10 The author suggests that requiring state prisoners in
civil rights matters to exhaust available state administrative and
judicial remedies before seeking redress in federal court will
render justice more efficient and effective without sacrificing or
jeopardizing the utilization of the federal forum for unresolved
constitutional violations."
Presently, to bring a constitutional attack on conviction or
sentence in a federal forum, a state prisoner must meet the rig-
ors of section 2254 of 28 U.S.C.'1 The requirements of exhaus-
tion of state remedies in the federal habeas corpus statute make
consummate good sense. The state has primary interest in seeing
that the state prisoner has been convicted in a manner which
accords with our constitutional safeguards.' s State courts also
are guardians of the federal Constitution and should be accorded
a first opportunity to correct constitutional error.' 4 If the popu-
lace comes to rely on federal courts for constitutional protection,
state courts through disuse will be rendered incapable of safe-
guarding the rights of its citizens."5 It is well recognized that
withholding access to the federal courts in such a situation until
state remedies have been found wanting, aids in promoting both
federalism and our federal system.'6
10. The statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), does not contain an exhaus-
tion requirement. See supra note 7. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not inter-
preted § 1983 to include such a requirement. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
516 (1982).
11. This requirement of exhaustion in all § 1983 cases has been proposed by the
United States Senate. See S. 3018, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982). This Article limits its
suggestion of exhaustion to state prisoner § 1983 cases.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See supra note 6.
13. If a prisoner's conviction is not obtained consistently with the Constitution, the
conviction-is subject to reversal and the indictment is subject to dismissal and an indi-
vidual convicted of a crime may go free. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979);
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 35 (1980).
15. Id.
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-20 (1963); Note, Rose v. Lundy and Rule 9(b):
[Vol. 4:61
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Cases brought by state prisoners, however, face no such pro-
cedural winnowing even when the most insubstantial complaint
is alleged to be within the purview of section 1983."7 To gain
access to the federal courts, all that a state prisoner need do is
allege a violation of "civil rights" providing he is not seeking to
upset a conviction or sentence. Once his complaint is filed, the
state counsel must acknowledge the lawsuit and answer or move
to dismiss."
This uneven access to federal court is unwise and is in need
of immediate correction. Requiring exhaustion of state judicial
and administrative remedies by state prisoners' 9 prior to permit-
ting the institution of a civil rights action in federal court will
benefit not only our overworked federal courts, but also all
others involved: the state, for it would have a more direct con-
trol over the handling of its prison population; the state courts,
for they would obtain justifiable jurisdiction over these cases;
and the prisoner with a bona fide complaint would have the
problem resolved in the most expeditious manner.
The Congress must re-evaluate the non-exhaustion doctrine
as applied to section 1983 lawsuits. The need for prompt con-
gressional action is imperative since our federal courts are pres-
ently being swamped by an unprecedented explosion of litiga-
tion brought by state prisoners.2 0
In support of this recommendation, Part I of this Article
will discuss the history of section 1983 and its historical perspec-
tive. Part II of this Article will analyze the inadequacy of the
recent congressional enactment, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Part III of
this Article will explore the habeas corpus exhaustion rule and
the need for its application to state prisoners who institute sec-
tion 1983 lawsuits.
Will the Court Abuse the Great Writ, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 335, 343 (1983).
17. See supra note 10.
18. Failure to respond to a complaint subjects the defendant to entry of a default
judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. V 1981). See infra note 66.
20. The concept of exhaustion in § 1983 cases is not unfamiliar to the Supreme
Court. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent to a denial of certiorari joined in by Justice Black-
mun and the Chief Justice, contended that exhaustion in § 1983 cases should be required
when a state court proceeding has already been initiated. City of Columbus v. Leonard,
443 U.S. 905, 907 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1983]
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II. Historical Background of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Civil Rights Act of April 20, 187121 (Act), was enacted
to combat thinly veiled attempts of the post-Civil War states to
deny the constitutional rights of some of their citizens.2 Section
1's of the Act, the forerunner to section 1983,24 was established
"to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced." '
At the time of the Act's passage the southern states were
actively participating in egregious violations of the fourteenth
amendment.2  Those state laws which did guarantee the consti-
tutional tenets of equal protection were arbitrarily and discrimi-
natorily enforced.2 The Ku Klux Klan, a primary target of this
remedial legislation, was terrorizing blacks in the South with im-
punity.28 In Congress, Representative Beatty of Ohio dramati-
cally portrayed the need for remedial legislation:
21. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)). This Act is also commonly called the Ku Klux Act of 1871.
22. Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278, 303 (D. Colo. 1982).
23. This section reads as follows:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any
such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the con-
trary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in
the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like
cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other
remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such
cases.
Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See supra note 7.
25. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,180 (1961). The Act was also to provide "a federal
remedy in a federal court in protection of a federal right." Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371
F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
26. For example, in Kentucky, a black man was precluded from testifying in state
court against a white man leaving the federal courts to "enforce the United States laws
by which negroes may testify." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1871).
27. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982).
28. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 174.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/4
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
[M]en were murdered, houses were burned, women were out-
raged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and
the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to punish-
ment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent.
The State, from lack of power or inclination, practically denied
the equal protection of the law to these persons.29
It was against this historical backdrop that the Act became
law. The Act had three purposes: one, to override invidious state
legislation; two, to provide remedies in the absence of adequate
state laws; and three, to provide a remedy to replace facially ad-
equate but unenforced state laws.30 Congress was looking in part
beyond the plight of the blacks in the post-bellum South and
the influence of the Ku Klux Klan when it enacted this law:
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human
liberty and human rights."' It was ensuring a federal forum for
the protection of constitutional rights and liberties and implicit
in that guarantee was a suspension of the usual exhaustion re-
quirement.32 Nonetheless, after fulfilling congressional intent
and combatting deplorable post-Civil War conditions, the stat-
ute remained essentially dormant during its first century. 3 This
inactivity was partly the result of a judicially created require-
ment that a section 1983 plaintiff must prove a wilful invasion of
constitutional rights.3 Moreover, the lawsuits were limited pri-
marily to voting rights and race discrimination cases.33 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,6 nearly one hundred
years after the passage of section 1983, eradicated the judicially
created specific intent requirement. The Monroe Court liberally
construed section 1983 and by so doing, the Court paved the
way for extensive litigation under this section.
The Monroe Court was presented with inexcusable behavior
29. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871).
30. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
31. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 683 (1978) (com-
ments of Rep. Shellabarger).
32. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. at 503, 507.
33. See Note, Civil Rights: The Supreme Court Finds New Ways to Limit Section
1983, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 776 (1981).
34. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 167; Note, supra note 33, at 777 nn.9-10. See
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
35. Whitman, supra note 14.
36. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1983]
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by Chicago, Illinois police officers. The police, acting without a
warrant, broke into petitioner's home, and ransacked every
room, while the petitioner and his family were forced to stand
naked in their living room. The petitioner was then taken to the
police station for extended interrogation without ever appearing
before the available magistrate. The petitioner was neither al-
lowed to call his family attorney nor were charges ever pressed
against him. The Court held that plaintiff's section 1983 com-
plaint against the police officers was tenable. In so holding, the
Court stated that "the federal remedy [created by section 1983]
is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 1 The
previous restrictions on the civil rights statute were loosened to
delete proof that the constitutional violations were "wilfully"
committed.3 8 Despite the generous construction of section 1983,
the Monroe Court at the same time steadfastly refused to extend
the scope of the statute to include municipalities because it an-
ticipated that there would be an antagonistic congressional re-
sponse to the proposal that municipalities be held liable under
section 1983,11 a view which has since substantially changed.' 0
Justice Frankfurter, while expressing his disdain for the
documented police behavior, filed a vigorous dissent. He argued
that redress for the violative conduct remained in state court.
According to Justice Frankfurter, section 1983 did not appoint
the federal courts to the position of guardskeeper over the
state's day-to-day business."1 Rather, he contended that it was
in response to the Civil War atrocities that the statute was cre-
ated and made "enforceable in the federal courts only in in-
stances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts
because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage'
sanctioned the grievance complained of."' 2 He argued that fed-
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 191.
40. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 701. This turnabout
suggests that despite what appeared in Monroe to be a clear legislative history to the
contrary, the scope of § 1983 is not graven in stone. This re-evaluation of the legislative
intent might also lead Congress to redetermine the need for exhaustion in § 1983
lawsuits.
41. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871,
[Vol. 4:61
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eral intervention dangerously swayed the balance of power be-
tween the state and federal government and destroyed the con-
cept of the states as primary guardians of the rights of their
citizens. 48 Frankfurter's reluctance to interfere with state opera-
tions was not an example of judicial timidity but rather a recog-
nition that the legislative necessity for section 1983 no longer
held.44 "We cannot expect to create an effective means of protec-
tion for human liberties by torturing an 1871 statute to meet the
problems of 1960."4
The Monroe majority emphasized the need for automatic
federal review in section 1983 cases while the dissent warned
against the dangers of an overbroad construction of this section.
Lost in the struggle between these diametrically opposed views
was a conciliatory middle ground where access to the federal
courts in a section 1983 lawsuit could be restricted by requiring
exhaustion of judicial and administrative remedies in state
courts. This "neutral ground," which would parallel the habeas
corpus statute, respects both the majority's concern for adjudi-
cation of constitutional violations in a federal forum and the dis-
sent's concerns for comity, federalism, and strict judicial con-
struction. Unfortunately, this "neutral ground" was neither
discussed nor considered by the Monroe Court.
The expansive Monroe holding encouraged prisoners to rely
increasingly upon section 1983 to resolve any disputes arguably
presenting constitutional violations. From the enactment of the
statute to 1960, only 250 section 1983 cases were filed." In 1966,
such cases numbered but a few hundred filings;'1 in 1972, there
were 3348 state prisoner civil rights cases commenced; 48 but, in
the one year period ending June 30, 1982, 16,739 civil rights ac-
tions were filed by state prisoners. " From 1970 through 1980,
state prisoner petitions, brought pursuant to section 1983, rose
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
43. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 237-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 243 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 244 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. Note, Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in the Federal Courts,
27 CATH. U.L. REv. 115, 115 n.4 (1977-1978).
47. Whitman, supra note 14, at 6.
48. JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 8 n.14.
49. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 216.
1983]
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451.5% ."0 Civil rights actions brought in 1982 by state prisoners
under section 1983 amounted to well over twelve percent of all
private civil filings in the federal district courts.61
This increase in utilization of section 1983 suggests that
congressional intent is not being fulfilled. Instead of combatting
obvious injuries, this free and direct access to federal court has
produced a plethora of complaints from state prisoners which
are either insubstantial or involve claims better confronted ini-
tially by state government.
It is not the magnitude of these filings alone that is dis-
turbing. It is the frivolity of the majority of the cases when
placed under constitutional analysis that calls out for reform.'2
To demonstrate the magnitude of this problem, this Article will
describe a sampling of section 1983 state prisoner cases lately
presented in the southern district of New York.
In Hogarth v. Drucker," the plaintiff sought $500 million
for mental anguish and physical torture suffered because he was
forcibly shaven in order to appear in a court ordered line-up.
Hogarth did not utilize the available grievance procedure.
In Icesom v. Ward," plaintiff, who was transferred to a new
facility, sought $10,000 in damages for not receiving the follow-
ing: a Playboy magazine, a package containing legal materials,
and a paycheck from his transferor institution.
50. Id.
51. Id. Out of a total of 130,420 private civil filings, 17,575 were prisoner civil rights
petitions.
52. There is a statutory avenue available for limitation of frivolous pro se § 1983
cases. The district court may dismiss a case when presented with an in forma pauperis
application when "satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1976). The inherent problems with this statute are two-fold: first, a pro se complaint is
to be read liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and dismissal at this
stage may discriminate against inartful plaintiffs; second, the case is still initiated in
federal court while bypassing the available state remedies.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court's § 1915(d)
sua sponte dismissal of a § 1983 complaint holding that "a federal judge should not
dismiss a prisoner's pro se, in forma pauperis claim as frivolous unless statute or control-
ling precedent clearly forecloses the pleading, liberally construed." Cameron v. Fogarty,
705 F.2d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1983).
"It is generally agreed that most prisoner rights cases are frivolous and ought to be
dismissed under even the most liberal definition of frivolity." JUMCIAL CENTER REPORT,
supra note 8, at 9.
53. No. 82 Civ. 0433 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 22, 1982).
54. No. 82 Civ. 3607 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 2, 1982).
[Vol. 4:61
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In James v. Walters, 5 plaintiff sought millions of dollars in
compensatory damages for the threat to his manhood caused by
inadequate medical treatment of a skin rash.
In Belton v. Books, 5" plaintiff sought $50,000 in damages
for mental stress resulting from harrassment by a correctional
officer. This harrassment was allegedly manifested by the defen-
dant's ripping a manuscript out of plaintiff's typewriter and
prohibiting the plaintiff from going to the law library. The griev-
ance procedure was not utilized.In another lawsuit by Mr. Belton, who filed fifteen section
1983 petitions from October 5, 1982 through March 17, 1983, the
plaintiff sought $1 million in damages for the misdiagnosis of
gonorrhea as syphilis. 5 7
In Allende v. Cooke," plaintiff claimed $20 million in dam-
ages for injuries resulting from the New York state court system
of rotating judges.
The western district of New York has also been presented
with inappropriate section 1983 cases: in Citro v. Department of
Corrections," the plaintiff's complaint alleging a correction of-
ficer's failure to provide additional rolls of toilet paper upon re-
quest was dismissed as frivolous; in Slate v. Shrar,60 the plaintiff
brought suit against his prison medical staff for loss of a testicle.
The above sampling of cases demonstrates that many suits
brought against prison personnel could benefit from an effective
grievance procedure, i.e., one that is tailored to suit the recur-
ring problems of prison life. For example, allegations of inade-
quate medical care should be investigated immediately and, if
merited, personnel changes could be effected before the time it
takes a defendant to file an answer in federal court. The danger
of not having the states develop mechanisms which can effi-
ciently and fairly adjudicate minor problems is that the federal
courts become small claims courts for prisoners. This result is
not only inconsistent with the congressional intent behind sec-
tion 1983 but it also serves to undermine the effectiveness of the
55. No. 82 Civ. 0053 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 3, 1982).
56. No. 82 Civ. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 16, 1983).
57. Belton v. Bantum, No. 83 Civ. 2200 (S.D.N.Y. fied Mar. 22, 1983).
58. No. 83 Civ. 4322 (S.D.N.Y. case dismissed June 8, 1983).
59. No. 82 Civ. 588T (W.D.N.Y. case dismissed Aug. 19, 1982).
60. No. 82 Civ. 552T (W.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 1982).
1983]
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federal courts to defend basic constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has responded to the burgeoning law-
suits arising from a "statute that already has burst its historical
bounds"'" by retreating from its previously generous construc-
tion of section 1983. In 1981, in Parratt v. Taylor," a state in-
mate alleging the loss of a $23.50 hobby set was found not to
have alleged a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment resolvable under section 1983 when the avail-
able Nebraska tort remedy was sufficient. 5 On its facts it ap-
pears that Parratt is a case justly meriting dismissal. The case,
however, also demonstrates a narrowing of the type of lawsuits
adjudicable under section 1983.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
Dissatisfaction with an ever increasing civil calendar com-
prised of lawsuits brought under section 1983" resulted not only
in the judicial restrictions on the statute's applicability6 but
also in the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.6" This statute pro-
61. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
62. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
63. Id. at 543.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See supra note 7.
65. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
66. The statute provides:
(a)(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursu-
ant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that
such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice, continue
such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in order to require exhaustion
of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.
(2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not
be required unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined
that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the mini-
mum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Minimum standards for development and implementation of system for
resolution of grievances of confined adults; consultation, promulgation, submis-
sion, etc., by Attorney General of standards.
(1) No later than one hundred eighty days after May 23, 1980, the Attorney
General shall, after consultation with persons, State and local agencies, and organ-
izations with background and expertise in the area of corrections, promulgate min-
imum standards for the development and implementation of a plain, speedy, and
effective system for the resolution of grievances of adults confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility. The Attorney General shall submit such pro-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/4
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vides that when an adult state convict brings a section 1983 law-
suit, district courts are given the discretion to stay the lawsuit
for ninety days and order the plaintiff to pursue available state
remedies. This limited legislative response to a burdensome
problem demonstrates congressional recognition that some
mechanism, if properly developed and maintained, offers a just
and speedy resolution for prisoner complaints that otherwise
will end up in federal court." This statute encourages states to
posed standards for publication in the Federal Register in accordance with section
553 of Title 5. Such standards shall take effect thirty legislative days after publi-
cation unless, within such period, either House of Congress adopts a resolution of
disapproval of such standards.
(2) The minimum standards shall provide -
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or other
correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible),
in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with rea-
sons thereto at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature,
including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of
personal injury or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant in the
resolution of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged
reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision or direct
control of the institution.
(c) Procedure for review and certification of systems for resolution of griev-
ances of confined adults for determination of compliance with minimum stan-
dards; suspension or withdrawal of certification for noncompliance; development,
etc., by Attorney General.
(1) The Attorney General shall develop a procedure for the prompt review
and certification of systems for the resolution of grievances of adults confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, or pretrial detention facility, to de-
termine if such systems, as voluntarily submitted by the various States and politi-
cal subdivisions, are in substantial compliance with the minimum standards
promulgated under subsection (b) of this section.
(2) The Attorney General may suspend or withdraw the certification under
paragraph (1) at any time that he has reasonable cause to believe that the griev-
ance procedure is no longer in substantial compliance with the minimum stan-
dards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section.
(d) Failure of State to adopt or adhere to administrative grievance proce-
dure.The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance pro-
cedure consistent with this section shall not constitute the basis for an action
under section 1997a or 1997c of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. V 1981).
67. In Maryland, for example, the development of an effective grievance procedure
reduced prisoner filings by 66%. Note, supra note 46, at 124.
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create appropriate grievance systems and thus promotes "resolu-
tion of problems by the persons involved in prison administra-
tion. This should help to develop a sensitivity that may have
been otherwise lacking."a8 Moreover, Congress had hoped that
section 1997e would reduce the existing backlog in the district
courts. 6 9
The numerous limitations, however, included within section
1997e render it incapable of fulfilling congressional expectations.
First, even though a case may be held in abeyance for a period
not exceeding ninety days, it still remains on the civil calendar.7
Once a lawsuit has been commenced, the incentive diminishes
on the part of the prisoner-plaintiff to resolve the case adminis-
tratively especially if the prisoner sees an opportunity to leave
the confines of the prison walls and travel to the district court.7'
Second, exhaustion is only permitted when an existing
prison grievance procedure has been certified by the United
States Attorney General or when a district court judge deter-
mines that the procedure is in compliance with minimum due
process standards." Section 1997e is premised on a volunteer
system: states are not required to establish grievance procedures
or to move for certification of existing procedures. This limita-
tion ties the hands of the federal courts. For example, in Goff v.
Menke,7" the Eighth Circuit urged Iowa to adopt a procedure in
compliance with section 1997e to allow the statute to fulfill its
purposes: "Such a procedure would provide prisoners with a
more accessible and quicker remedy and remove a significant
number of cases from the federal docket. 7 4 In conjunction with
the establishment of a satisfactory method for internal adjudica-
tion of disputes, the Goff court recommended that Iowa work
assiduously to provide equitable and humane conditions for its
68. S. Rp. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 787, 816.
69. "Requiring the exhaustion of in-prison grievances should resolve some cases
thereby reducing the total number and help frame the issues in the remaining cases so as
to make them ready for expeditious court consideration." Id.
70. See Kennedy v. Herschler, 655 F.2d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1981).
71. It has been suggested that the writing of § 1983 complaints relieves the tedium
of prison life. Note, supra note 46, at 116.
72. The minimum standards are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 40 (1982).
73. 672 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1982).
74. Id. at 706.
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prisoners and further provide legal counsel to inmates in an at-
tempt to ferret out frivolous claims. 5 The laudable sentiments
expressed in Goff and shared by the author, however, ring
hollow as long as states do not accept the challenge to improve
existing procedures. As of 1980, six states had moved for certifi-
cation and only one has been certified.e Perhaps many states
believe that their existing judicial systems are sufficient and do
not want to create a duplicative procedure. The time has come,
therefore, to amend section 1997e and/or section 1983 to effectu-
ate the meaningful remedy they were intended to provide. An
exhaustion requirement, similar to the one imposed on habeas
corpus lawsuits, would provide that meaningful remedy. Forcing
state prisoners to present their complaints in the state courts
and encouraging the states to establish workable grievance pro-
cedures are principles consistent with the spirit of both section
1983 and section 1997e.
IV. Exhaustion
The suggestion that state prisoners be required to exhaust
state administrative and judicial remedies before resorting to the
federal courts is consistent with the general exhaustion rule ap-
plied to habeas corpus cases."7 Both section 198378 and section
2254 7 cases are intimately connected to an inmate's life; the for-
mer challenges the conditions of confinement and the latter
challenges the fact or duration of confinement.80 Therefore, it
seems anomalous to require exhaustion only in habeas corpus
cases. Both cases require similar relief: if conditions are in viola-
tion of section 1983, these conditions should be rectified quickly,
75. Id. For example, in New York, Prisoners' Legal Services exists to provide free
counsel to state inmates. Although its budget has been cut by the state, expansion of its
budget might well prove economically beneficial in the long run.
76. Letter from James A. Finney, United States Department of Justice, to Judge
Duffy (May 6, 1983).
77. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See supra note 7.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See supra note 6.
80. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973). "[Tjhe essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody. . ." Id. at
484. "[A] section 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of prison life, but not to the fact or length of
his custody." Id. at 499.
19831
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and if the confinement itself is unlawful, the inmate should be
released.
The policy reasons supporting exhaustion of available reme-
dies in habeas corpus proceedings apply equally in a section
1983 context. Exhaustion does not deny federal jurisdiction over
constitutional issues; in appropriate cases "it merely defers it.""1
That a state prisoner must first bring his complaint to state
court has been the law even predating its codification in section
2254.2 This reflects the comity which should exist between the
federal and state governments. Clearly the state is responsible
for the confinement of each state prisoner. The imprisonment
comes about through the processes of the state judicial system.
The requirement of exhaustion is an accommodation of our fed-
eral system designed to give the state the initial opportunity to
pass upon and correct alleged violations of federal rights of its
prisoners.83 Moreover, "[ilt permits the states to correct viola-
tions through their own procedures, and it encourages the estab-
lishment of such procedures. It is consistent with the principles
of comity that apply whenever federal courts are asked to review
state action or supersede state proceedings. ' ' " It defies logic to
allow prisoners to travel to the nearest federal courthouse to re-
solve disputes before first being required to ask the prison ad-
ministration for the requested relief.
The doctrine of federalism is equally well served by exhaus-
81. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 532 (1982).
82. State prisoners were first statutorily permitted the use of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge their convictions in federal court in an early judiciary act. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.
28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86. Shortly after the Act's passage, the federal circuit court in Geor-
gia indicated that a state prisoner who had not sought any state appellate or collateral
remedies could nevertheless win immediate release on federal habeas corpus if he proved
the unconstitutionality of his conviction. Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 105 (C.C.N.D.
Ga. 1875) (No. 1862). This holding was approved by the Supreme Court. Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
A multifaceted rationale of abstention and comity developed between 1867 and
1948, when the Act was codified. "[C]omity demands that the state courts, under whose
process he [habeas corpus petitioner] is held, and which are equally with the Federal
courts charged with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitu-
tional rights, should be appealed to in the first instance." Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195
(1892). These concerns led to enactment of an exhaustion requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976). See supra note 6.
83. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 419-20 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204
(1950)).
84. Id. Accord Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
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tion. 5 The Supreme Court has often stated that federal courts
are not to interfere in the day to day operation of state prisons. 86
Federal courts are empowered to correct prison conditions fall-
ing below a constitutional minimum, 7 but our dual judicial sys-
tem requires that the exercise of ultimate power should be spar-
ingly used. 88 This doctrine is particularly appropriate when both
the state prisons and the state courts are well equipped to han-
dle the ongoing complaints that arise. It is one more recognition
that not all wisdom reposes solely with the federal judiciary and
that the judicial systems of the states have an able judiciary
seeking to administer justice fairly and expeditiously. 89 Requir-
ing exhaustion of state remedies by state prisoners is an expres-
sion of respect for our dual judicial system and concern for har-
monious relations between the two adjudicatory systems.9 0
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the salutary
and practical effect of enhancing the familiarity of state courts
with federal doctrines.9 1 The judicial efficiency resulting from
exhaustion is self-evident. Federal courts need only then hear
complaints that were not resolved through available administra-
tive and judicial channels. For instance, "[ilnitial reference of
private civil rights disputes to state administrative or judicial
85. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 222 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125-26
(1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974). See also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (federal courts are also to defer to the expertise of the administra-
tion of federal facilities). Lower federal courts have heeded this warning. See Campbell
v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1980); but see Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 53
(2d Cir. 1977).
87. Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d at 705.
88. Restriction of federal jurisdiction "reflects recognition that to no small degree
the effectiveness of the legal order depends upon the infrequency with which it~solves its
problems by resorting to determinations of ultimate power." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89. The school of thought suggesting a disparity between the ability of state and
federal judges has been emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court. Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). However, the
concept appears to have resurfaced. In Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (1983),
the Supreme Court intimates, without any support, that the states' courts have been
deficient in protecting the constitutional rights of their citizens.
90. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 76, 90 (1973). But see
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1976-1977).
91. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 90, at 76.
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processes may either eliminate the need for any federal judicial
action or significantly affect the posture of a dispute when it
does appear in federal court."9
Application of the exhaustion requirement is not woodenly
enforced in habeas corpus cases. Exhaustion is bypassed in a
habeas corpus lawsuit only when "there is either an absence of
an available state corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner." 3 Similarly, these exceptions should also apply to
section 1983 cases.94 This leaves an opening for direct access to
federal court when a life threatening situation or other ex-
traordinary case prevents exhaustion."3
The resultant benefits to the prisoners if exhaustion is re-
quired cannot be overemphasized. Not only will the states be
forced to maintain effective procedures administratively and ju-
dicially, but also inmates will obtain speedy results.98 Although
92. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam) (where availabil-
ity of state remedy was conjectural, further exhaustion of petitioner's habeas corpus
claim was not required). See Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979) (petitioner need not go through retrial when raising a double
jeopardy claim in his habeas corpus petition); Montes v. Jenkins, 581 F.2d 609, 611 (7th
Cir. 1978) (habeas corpus petitioners need not exhaust an ineffective state remedy); but
see Ray v. Howard, 486 F. Supp. 638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (state's four month delay in
resolving petitioner's claim is not "inordinate delay" warranting exception to habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). This requirement is consistent with the traditional
exceptions to the established rule mandating exhaustion of administrative avenues. See
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). For example, if the administrative remedy
is inadequate, unavailable or when the sufficiency of the remedy itself is being ques-
tioned, exhaustion is not required. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902-04 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). See also Rucker v.
Jane, 532 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
94. The exception to res judicata principles applicable to habeas corpus cases, Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. at 422, should apply as well to § 1983 cases. Congress could specifically
withdraw res judicata effect to the exhaustion of state judicial remedies. H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 90, at 107. Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision not to toll the applicable
statute of limitations while a section 1983 case is being exhausted, Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), would have to be overruled to allow for federal review of §
1983 cases.
95. Similarly, under § 1997e exhaustion is not required when "imminent danger to
life is alleged." S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 787, 817.
96. Prisoners need a "quick answer from a responsible decisionmaker." Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92
HAuv. L. Rv. 610, 642 (1979).
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the forum may be less attractive, disputes potentially will be re-
solved faster and without needless expense. There is a dire need
for "a simple and workable procedure by which every person
who has, or thinks he has, a grievance or complaint can be heard
promptly, fairly and fully."'97
Forcing inmates to exhaust is consistent with protection of
their constitutional liberties.9 8 It is not suggested that serious
constitutional violations do not occur behind prison walls or that
some disputes cannot be resolved within the state system."
However, resort to the federal courts in the first instance is no
more necessary in section 1983 cases than it is in habeas corpus
cases. Moreover, the spirit of section 1983, to preserve the fed-
eral forum for violations uncorrectable in the state courts, will
be enhanced if exhaustion is legislatively mandated. The federal
courts should not now condemn the states as sluggish and dis-
criminatory towards prisoners' constitutional rights until they
are afforded a good faith opportunity to correct violations, target
trouble areas and, in general, improve the quality of prison life.
This Article rejects as unfounded the arguments that sug-
gest today's prisoners are in a position akin to the blacks in the
post-bellum South and thus require immediate access to federal
court. 00 Equally untenable is the proposition that state courts
do not vigorously defend the constitutional rights of their citi-
zens. 01 Until the time when the state courts are deemed incapa-
ble of resolving constitutional issues, access to the federal forum
should be similarly restricted to habeas corpus petitioners and
section 1983 plaintiffs.
V. Conclusion
The non-exhaustion requirement presently incorporated
into section 1983102 does not serve the federal courts, the state
courts, the state prisons or the state inmates that it was
97. Address by Chief Justice Burger to the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral (Feb. 8, 1970).
98. See Whitman, supra note 14, at 10. Furthermore, "overextension of constitu-
tional protection may dilute and thus debase constitutional values." Id. at 27.
99. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
100. Whitman, supra note 14, at 68.
101. Neuborne, supra note 90, at 1105.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See supra note 7.
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designed, in part, to help. Section 1983 should be amended to
require state prisoners to exhaust administrative and judicial
remedies consistent with the habeas corpus statute. This is in
keeping with traditional exhaustion requirements and is in the
best interests of all parties. State prisoners will benefit by such
an amendment; resolution of their problems, which necessarily
are magnified by their incarceration, will be handled more effi-
ciently. Prisons present an overwhelming problem today and ex-
haustion will force prison administration and the states to
strengthen their capacity to handle their own problems without
sacrificing constitutional rights. In the final analysis, with the
adoption of this proposal, the federal court's ultimate protection
of constitutional rights will always be available, but need not be
invoked in the first instance.
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